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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RANDY J. MONTOYA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960227-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment
of conviction entered on March 29, 1996.x
Addendum A.

R. 184.

See

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

denying Montoya's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the
interior and trunk of the vehicle where the State claimed that it
had legally seized such evidence based on an inventory search of
the vehicle?
1

The trial court entered judgment of conviction in this case
on April 7, 1995. R. 55. Montoya filed an untimely pro se Notice
of Appeal on May 31, 1995.
R. 58.
This Court remanded the
original appeal to the trial court for appointment of counsel.
R. 68. The trial court appointed current counsel. Thereafter,
this Court dismissed the original appeal based on the filing of an
untimely Notice of Appeal.
Montoya then filed a petition for
extraordinary relief in the trial court, claiming in part that his
right to appeal was violated. On March 29, 1996, pursuant to State
v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), and State v. Hallett, 856
P.2d 1060
(Utah 1993), Judge Frederick resentenced Montoya
nunc pro tunc. Montoya filed a timely Notice of Appeal from that
Order on April 4, 1996. R. 186.

Standard of Review.

This Court reviews the trial court's

determination that a valid inventory search occurred for
correctness.

See State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah

1995); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).

Any

underlying factual findings are examined for clear error.

State

v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1994); Pena, 869 P.2d at 939.
Preservation of the Issue.

Defendant/Appellant Randy

Montoya ("Appellant" or "Montoya") filed a Motion to Suppress and
supporting Memorandum in the trial court.

R. 20-21.

A copy of

the motion and memorandum is contained in Addendum B.

On

February 6, 1995, the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing and
argument on the motion.

R. 93-143.

Thereafter, the trial judge

issued his oral ruling denying Montoya's motion.

R. 143-46.

The

trial judge signed written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law ("Findings and Conclusions") on March 24, 1995.

R. 50-54.

A

copy of the Findings and Conclusions is contained in Addendum C.
On February 17, 1995, Montoya entered a conditional plea of
guilty to the amended charge of Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a third degree felony, pursuant to State v. Sery, 758
P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).
ISSUE II;

R. 149-50.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

concluding that Montoya's Miranda rights were not violated?
Standard of Review.
is reviewed for correctness.

The trial court's legal conclusion
Pena, 869 P.2d at 940-41.

The

trial court is afforded "a measure of discretion" when this Court
applies that standard of review.

Id.
2

Any underlying factual

findings are reviewed for clear error.
Preservation of the Issue.

Id.

Montoya filed a Motion to

Suppress and supporting Memorandum in the trial court.

R. 2 0-21.

A copy of the motion and memorandum is contained in Addendum B.
On February 6, 1995, the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing
and argument on the motion.

R. 93-143.

Thereafter, the trial

judge issued his oral ruling denying Montoya's motion.
46.

R. 143-

The trial judge signed written Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions") on March 24,
1995.

R. 50-54.

A copy of the Findings and Conclusions is

contained in Addendum C.

On February 17, 1995, Montoya entered a

conditional plea of guilty to the amended charge of Possession of
a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, pursuant to Sery,
758 P.2d at 935.

R. 42, 149-50.

TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.

3

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The State charged Montoya with Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled substance with Intent to Distribute, a third degree
felony; Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor; and Intoxication, a class C misdemeanor.

R. 5-6.

On February 1, 1995, Montoya filed a motion to suppress evidence
seized from the vehicle and statements made to police officers in
absence of Miranda warnings.

R. 20-22.

On February 6, 1995,

the trial judge held a hearing on the motion to suppress and
denied the motion.

R. 37-38.

On February 17, 1995, Montoya entered a conditional plea
of guilty to the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance,
a third degree felony.

R. 39-43.

Pursuant to that conditional

plea, Montoya preserved the right to appeal the trial judge's
adverse ruling on Montoya's Motion to Suppress.

R. 42, 149-50.

On March 24, 1995, the trial judge entered written Findings and
Conclusions.

R. 50-54.

On April 7, 1995, the trial judge entered Judgment,
sentencing Montoya to serve zero to five years at the Utah State
4

Prison.

R. 55.

On May 23, 1995, Montoya filed a pro se Notice

of Appeal and Motion to Appoint Counsel.

R. 56-59.

This Court

temporarily remanded the case to the trial judge, who appointed
current counsel on August 31, 1995.

R. 68, 70, 72.

On

January 5, 1996, this Court dismissed the appeal based on the
untimely filing of Appellant's pro se Notice of Appeal.

R. 178.

On January 25, 1996, Montoya filed a Petition for
Extraordinary Relief.

R. 169.

That petition was based in part

on the denial of Montoya's right to appeal his conviction.

The

trial judge granted that petition and sentenced Montoya
nunc pro tunc on March 29, 1996.

R. 184.

Notice of Appeal on April 4, 1996.

Montoya filed a timely

R. 186.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 24, 1994 at 3:07 a.m., West Valley Police
Officer Paul Gill responded to a call at a convenience store
located at 4600 South and 4000 West in Salt Lake County.
95.

R. 93-

When Officer Gill arrived at the store, he found Montoya

standing outside the store next to a car.

R. 96.

wearing a button-up shirt, boxers and sandals.
else was in or near the vehicle.
to Montoya.

R. 97.

Montoya was

R. 96.

No one

The car did not belong

R. 106.

Backup officer Schmidt arrived in a separate police
vehicle at the same time as Gill or within a minute of his
arrival.

R. 97, 101, 120.

stood nearby.

R. 96, 121.

Gill talked to Montoya while Schmidt
Montoya appeared nervous, "jerky, not
5

real focused."

R. 96.

Gill asked Montoya if "he was on any

medication or anything."
few beers and a joint.

R. 96.

Montoya responded that he had a

R. 96, 121.

The officer described

Montoya's action as "erratic, jerking motions with his head, his
arms" and indicated that Montoya's condition worsened as the
officer talked with him.

R. 96.

Montoya mumbled and at times

was not responsive to the officer's questions.

R. 96-97.

At some point, Gill asked Montoya if he could search the
vehicle.

R. 103.

Montoya's response.

Gill testified that he could not remember
R. 103.

Gill decided to take Montoya into custody for public
intoxication and to call for medical help.

R. 97.

handcuffed Montoya and called for medical help.

Gill

R. 97, 102.

According to the officer, Montoya was in custody when the
handcuffs were placed on him.
McCarthy to go to the scene.

R. 126.
R. 97.

Gill called for Officer

Gill believed McCarthy had

a little more education "on different types of effects of
controlled substance or what might be going on with Mr. Montoya."
R. 98.

McCarthy indicated that he was called because the

officers "wanted to know what type of narcotics [Montoya] might
be using and what might have been used in the spoon."

R. 113.

McCarthy is considered by some people to be a narcotics expert
and is often called to the scene when narcotics are being
investigated.

R. 113.

Gill decided to impound the vehicle because he had
arrested Montoya.

R. 98.

Gill and Schmidt searched the
6

passenger compartment of the vehicle before McCarthy arrived.
R. 112.

During the course of the search, Gill saw dollars

scattered on the floor.

R. 98.

When the officer reached inside

the passenger side, he saw a syringe and spoon stuck between the
console and the passenger seat.

R. 98.

According to Officer

Schmidt, " [a]t that point in time the vehicle was going to be
impounded until Officer McCarthy had arrived and said he knows
this person and possibly where this owner of the vehicle lived."
R. 126.
The police report indicates that the officers were
searching for narcotics when they went through the car.

R. 105.

Gill testified that there are policies and procedures
which he follows in impounding a vehicle.

R. 103.

One of those

policies and procedures is the filling out of an inventory form
as part of an inventory search.

R. 104.

None of the officers

filled out an inventory form in this case.

R. 104.

Gill later

testified that he does not always fill out a form when he does an
inventory search.

R. 105.

When later asked, "Isn't [filling out

a form] standard procedure [for an inventory search]?," Gill
responded:

"Depends on the type of search, depends on the

totality of the circumstances, whether or not the vehicle's
taken, state tax impounds, it's on the impound reports.
didn't have an impound report at this time."

We

R. 105-06.

Gill

also testified that when he impounds a vehicle, it is his
procedure to take an inventory of all items in the vehicle.
R. 98.

Gill indicated that when the officers searched the car,
7

they found a number of items which they ordinarily would put on
an inventory form such as money and a stereo.

R. 104.

When McCarthy arrived, Officers Gill and Schmidt had
already searched the interior of the vehicle and Montoya was in
custody.

R. 97, 112, 126.

McCarthy testified that when he

arrived, Montoya was handcuffed but not yet in the patrol car.
R. 107.

Officers Gill and Schmidt were talking to Montoya.

R. 107.

Officers Gill and Schmidt told McCarthy the location of

a syringe and spoon they had found while searching the car.
R. 112.
McCarthy recognized Montoya and began talking to him.
R. 107-08.

McCarthy stated that Montoya "had foaming of the

mouth . . . was real jittery," that his eyes were dilated and "he
had marks on him to show that he had been intravenously ingesting
something."

R. 108.

McCarthy asked Montoya "point-blank" whether he "was
doing some cheve," and Montoya said he was.

R. 108.

to McCarthy, "cheve" is a street name for heroin.

According

R. 108.

McCarthy testified that the other officers left the
search of the vehicle to him, and he saw the spoon and syringe,
then began working on the trunk.

R. 109.

McCarthy explained

that Gill asked him to take care of the search because the other
officers were trying to find the identity of the vehicle's owner
and Gill "was going to be transporting to the prison and stuff."
R. 109.
trunk.

Schmidt was with McCarthy, however, when he searched the
R. 99-100, 109, 122.
8

In the trunk, McCarthy found a container in which there
were five balloons containing aluminum foil and heroin.
The container was on the passenger side in the rear.

R. 109.

R. 109.

In

the trunk, there was a piece of carpeting with a spare tire
underneath it.

R. 112.

under the carpet.

The container was in that vicinity and

R. 112-13.

McCarthy stated that he did not

think it was under the tire because he tried not to remove the
tire "because it's a pain because you have to put them back with
those little wing nuts and stuff," and he could not remember
removing the tire.

R. 113.

The trial court found that the

heroin was found in five containers located under the spare tire.
R. 51.
McCarthy indicated that he was familiar with the West
Valley Police Department's policies regarding inventory searches
and that he "helped write the zero tolerance policy on impounding
vehicles."

R. 110.

He testified that the policy with respect to

making inventory searches is as follows:
McCarthy: Any time we arrest anybody, any time a
vehicle's going to be impounded, an inventory
will be done, and if possible, a canine officer
will have the dog do a sniff of the vehicle for
the purposes of looking for narcotics.
Prosecutor:
instance?

And was that policy followed in this

McCarthy: I think we had called for a canine,
but they got off at two that morning, so there
wasn't one available.
Prosecutor: Now do you ordinarily make an
inventory list in the course of this inventory
search?

9

McCarthy: No, if there's something out of place,
you would note it. If there was something of
value or something like that, you could take it
into custody or you could give it to the owner.
We do have an inventory sheet. I very frequently
use it. I just note it in the narrative of the
report.

On cross-examination, McCarthy changed his testimony and
indicated that he did not frequently use the forms.

Instead, he

stated as follows:
Defense counsel: We don't have any inventory
sheets or inventory forms, correct?
McCarthy: No, I very rarely use them. It's like
they say, if it's a state tax, that is an
inventory portion right on the state tax form.
This vehicle wasn't being seized for that. I'd
already determined to let the owners have it
back.
R. 116.
When asked whether the West Valley Police Department has
an inventory sheet, McCarthy responded:
McCarthy: They do and it's the present policy,
and the policy then is the supervisor on duty
determines whether or not the car is going to be
forfeitable and that night I knew, because there
was a large lien on it, it was a brand new car,
the city would not be interested in paying off
the lien.
Defense counsel: And isn't it true that the
normal policy and procedure is to fill out the
inventory sheet?
McCarthy: No, like I said, it's -- if it's going
to be state tax, that is a state tax form. If
it's just a driver arrest, hold for a warrant,
there's a section on the back of the handwritten
report where you can fill in vehicle information.
As far as inventory, there's been a lot of
discussion on the bottom because there's no
section there for locked containers. We've been
10

advised to just make a notation in your report,
what if anything had to be unlocked or opened.
R. 117.
When discussing the reasons for inventory searches,
McCarthy indicated an additional reason for such searches "is to
find dope.»

R. 118.

The vehicle was not impounded.

The officers asked

McCarthy to impound the car, and "then once we found out who the
owners were, that's when I [McCarthy] asked if I could take care
of it in a different manner."

R. 113.

McCarthy recognized the

name of the car's owner and was familiar with the owner's family
from drug investigations.

R. 115.

It is not clear from the

record the point at which McCarthy learned the owner's identity.
McCarthy and Schmidt went to the owner's residence.
R. 125.

When McCarthy made contact with the owner of the car, he

asked for consent to search her residence.
said the owner declined consent.

R. 116.

R. 115-16.

Schmidt

Schmidt was not sure

why McCarthy asked to search the residence, but Schmidt was there
when McCarthy asked.

R. 125.

Gill attempted to have further conversations with Montoya
but testified that they "didn't go very far."

R. 100.

Montoya

appeared to be having a hard time understanding the questions and
was not giving direct answers.

R. 100.

Medical help arrived

soon thereafter, and Gill's questioning apparently stopped.
R. 100.
Gill did not testify as to when he might have given
Montoya Miranda warnings.

He did deny that he never gave Montoya
11

Miranda warnings.

R. 105.

Defense counsel: Isn't it true you never gave
the defendant any Miranda warnings?
Officer Gill:

No.

R. 105.
McCarthy questioned Montoya but did not give him Miranda
warnings.

R. 114.

Schmidt also did not give Montoya Miranda

warnings.

R. 124.

McCarthy asked Montoya about the owner of the

vehicle and some other people.

R. 114.

Even after the drugs

were found, McCarthy continued to question Montoya without
Mirandizing him.
Defense counsel: Isn't it true that even after
the drugs were found, you continued to
interrogate the defendant while he was seated in
the police car?
McCarthy: Like I said, my concern, it wasn't an
interrogation type of thing because I know him
and I know the family. I wanted to make sure he
was okay. He finally told me he was going to
overdose and that's why we were concerned about
medical people.
R. 118.
Montoya testified that he was at the convenience store
that night to purchase cereal, milk, Pepsi, a newspaper, and
ravioli.

R. 128.

He had taken a five dollar bill into the store

but had to return to his car for more money.

R. 128.

getting money from the car, the officers approached.
They told him, "hold it right there."

R. 129.

As he was
R. 129.

The officers

began questioning him about this condition, and Montoya
ultimately responded that he had "smoked a joint and drank the
beer."

R. 131.
12

Montoya testified further that after he was placed in the
police vehicle, the two officers went through his car and then
used a flashlight to search the trunk until "some more officers
pulled up."
R. 132.
trunk.

R. 131.

The officers found nothing in the trunk.

Officer McCarthy then arrived and searched the car and
R. 133.

He pulled out "carpets and stuff" and, after

about five minutes, found something.

R. 133.

According to Montoya, prior to the search, the heroin was
under a carpet and insulation, apparently under the tire.
R. 134.

It could not be seen just by looking in the trunk.

R. 134.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State failed to sustain its burden of establishing
that a valid inventory search occurred in this case.

The State

failed to establish that impoundment was necessary where, among
other things, officers were able to ascertain the owner's
identity and return the vehicle.

The officers' testimony failed

to establish the standardized procedures which West Valley
officers are required to follow in conducting inventory searches.
The testimony does not establish, among other things, whether
searching in the trunk and under the spare tire is part of a
standardized inventory search.

Nor does the testimony establish

that inventory searches are designed to compile an inventory of
items in the vehicle.

Instead, the testimony established that

officers have almost unlimited discretion as to how to proceed.
13

Additionally, the evidence in this case establishes that the
search was a pretext to search for evidence.

In this case where

the State did not establish the necessity of impounding the
vehicle, the vehicle was returned to its owner prior to
impoundment, the officers acknowledged they were searching the
vehicle for drugs, no inventory list was made, and the evidence
was found in a container under the spare tire and the State did
not put on evidence establishing that searching under a spare
tire was part of standardized inventory procedures, the State
failed to establish that this search fit within the inventory
exception to the Fourth Amendment.

Accordingly, the items seized

from the vehicle must be suppressed.
The trial court's determination that Montoya's Miranda
rights were not violated because he did not make incriminating
statements after being placed in custody is incorrect and clearly
erroneous.

McCarthy questioned Montoya after he was placed in

custody and Montoya responded in an incriminating manner.

The

State did not establish that Montoya was Mirandized prior to such
questioning or that he waived his rights.

Accordingly, the trial

court's ruling on the Miranda issue was incorrect and should be
reversed.

14

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE OFFICERS CONDUCTED A
VALID INVENTORY SEARCH.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
The general rule under the Fourth Amendment requires that
officers obtain a warrant based on probable cause in ordei to
search an area in whi ch an individual holds a "reasonable
"expectation of privacy.'
(Utah App. 1992)

State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 985

[C:i tatii oris <: )iii i tted] .

Several narrow] y drawn exceptions to the warrant
requirement exist.

Id.

Where officers conduct a warrantless

search, the S t a t e h a s t: h e b i i r c:i e n o f e s t a b 1 i s h i n g 11 l a t t h e
circumstances of a search "constitute an exception to the warrant
requirement."

ii-L./ (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,

762 (196 9 ) ; State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Uta 1 I 1984) )
A routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded
vehicle is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment
requirement.

See South Dakota v. Opperman, >12 8 U.S. 3 64,

S. Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

In Opperman, the United

States Supreme Court held that police officers who follow a
15
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standardized procedure for inventorying the contents of a
lawfully impounded vehicle do not violate the Fourth Amendment in
circumstances where there is no suggestion that the inventory
"was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive."
Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3099.
The Opperman Court recognized that inventory searches
serve three purposes:

(1) "the protection of the owner's

property while it remains in police custody," (2) protection of
"the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen
property," and (3) "the protection of the police from potential
danger."

Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3097; see also State v. Johnson,

745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987) (citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369,
96 S. Ct. at 3097) . Based on these purposes and the lesser
expectation of privacy in vehicles, the Opperman Court concluded
that inventory searches which are conducted pursuant to standard
police procedures and which are not a pretext to search the
vehicle for investigatory purposes are reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment even though such searches are not based on
probable cause.
Subsequent United States Supreme Court cases emphasize
the role of standardized procedures in determining the
reasonableness of inventory searches.

See, e.g., Colorado v.

Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987);
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1
(1990).
In Bertine, the Court held that officers may open locked
16

containers during I: I:if.' course of an inventory search without
violating the Fourth Amendment as long as such officers are
following standardized procedures and are not acting "in bad
faith or for the purpose of investigation "
at 741.

Bertine, "< ^n c

ct.

Relying on its decision in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462

U.S. 640, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983)

t .he Coi irt

indicated that officers may exercise discretion in conducting an
inventory search "so long as such discretion is exercised
according to standard criteria and on the basis of something
other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity."
107 S. Ct. at 743.
principles that

Bertine,

Indeed, the Bertine court reaffirmed the
"l 0.; I ingle familiar standard is essential I. u

guide officers, who have only limited time and expertise to
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests
involved :i : i the speci f ic circumstances they conf ront. ' "

Id , ,

((quoting Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648, 103 S. Ct. at 2610)
(quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458, 101 S. Ct. 2860,
2863, 69 L.Ed.*'d 768 (1981)).

Hence, while officers may exercise

some discretion where such discretion is guided by specific,
standardized procedures, such discretion may not be completely
unlimited and still pass constitutional muster.

See also Florida

v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990).
In Wells, 495 U.S. at 1, 110 S. Ct. at 1632, the Court
further clarifies that in order to comply with the Fourth
Amendment, inventory searches must be conducted according to
standard procedures and not afford unlimited discretion no
17

officers.

The Wells Court held that absent a standardized policy

regarding the opening of closed containers during an inventory
search, evidence seized from inside a closed container during an
inventory search must be suppressed.

Id. at 1635.

The Wells Court emphasized that the requirement that
inventory searches be conducted pursuant to standardized
procedures arises out of the principle that an inventory search
cannot be used as a subterfuge to search for investigatory
purposes.

Id.

Our view that standardized criteria, [citation
omitted], or established routine, Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S. Ct. 2605,
2610, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), must regulate the
opening of containers found during inventory
searches is based on the principle that an
inventory search must not be a ruse for a general .
rummaging in order to discover incriminating
evidence. The policy or practice governing
inventory searches should be designed to produce
an inventory. The individual police officer must
not be allowed so much latitude that inventory
searches are turned into "a purposeful and
general means of discovering evidence of a
crime," Bertine, 479 U.S., at 376, 107 S. Ct., at
743 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635 (emphasis added).
Various Utah cases have also discussed the parameters of
inventory searches.

See, e.g., Strickling, 844 P.2d at 979;

State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986); State v. Sterger, 808
P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah
1985); State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987).

These cases

along with Qpperman, Bertine and Wells establish:

(1) the State

has the burden of establishing "the necessity for the taking and
the inventory of the vehicle" (Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268); (2) the
18

v e h i c l e m u s t b e l a w f u l l y i m p o u n d e d f o r til le :i nv ei it or * r to be
reasonable (Hygh, 711 P. 2d at 268; Ricef

7

:

;;". ;.d at 696;

Sterger, 808 P.2d at 125 ("the impoundment and inventory search
of defendant's car" must be justified)).

:-*=> inventory search

must be conducted according to standardized procedures which are
designed to produce an inventory of the items :i n the vehi c] e and
not as a "fishing expedition for evidence" (Sterger, 808 P.2d at
125);

(;) the State has the burden of introducing evidence that

such a standardized, reasonable procedure exists, "and that the
challenged police activity was essentially in conformance with
that procedure" (Strickling, 844 P.2d at 988 (quoting Hygh, 711
P.2d at 269 (quo^ ;\.

~:.-J**>*--

Search and Seizure, Sec

4, mt

576-77 (1978))); (5) while officers can exercise limited
discretion when following standardized procedures, the allowance
of unlii mi t e d d i s c r e t i o n :i n d e t e r m i n i n g whetl lei t o :iropoiirid a
vehicle or how to conduct an inventory violates the Fourth
Amendment (Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635); (6) an inventory search
cannot be condi icted as a pretext for investigating and searching
for evidence of a crime (Hygh, 711 P.2d at 270; Rice, 717 P.2d at
696) ; and (7) inventory of closed containers must be conducted
according to standardized procedure explicitly regulating closed
containers (Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 742; Wells, 110 S. Ct. at
1635;

Johnson, 745 P.2d at 455).
In Hygh, the Utah Supreme Court held that the search

could "not be fairly characterized as an inventory search" and
therefore violated the Fourth Amendment
19

; 1 :i P. 2d at: 2 70

I'Tie

Court pointed out that although Salt Lake City has "a regularized
set of procedures which guard against arbitrariness by an officer
in the field," the officer did not follow the procedures.
269-70.

Id. at

The officer "did not completely search the vehicle and

did not make any kind of a list of the items in the automobile."
Id.at 270.

Additionally, it appeared that the officer was

searching the vehicle for investigatory purposes since the
officer, who noticed that Hygh resembled a picture of a robbery
suspect, sent for and received that picture prior to conducting
the search.

Accordingly, the "'inventory' search was merely a

pretext for a warrantless search," and the Utah Supreme Court
suppressed the evidence.

Id.

In Steraer, 808 P.2d at 125, this Court indicated that an
inventory search must be "conducted for inventory purposes, in a
legal manner, and not merely as a 'fishing expedition for
evidence'."

The Steraer court held that a bifurcated inventory

which was initiated immediately and completed later due to the
need for the officer to prioritize his duties was a valid
inventory search even though the written policies which were
introduced into evidence were "silent as to how soon after a
vehicle is impounded the inventory must be completed, and whether
bifurcated searches are permitted."

Id.

While inventory searches must be made pursuant to
standardized procedures which ensure that the inventory search is
not a pretext for a warrantless investigatory search, a valid
inventory search made by an officer with an investigatory motive
20

is v a l i d u n d e r t h e F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t .
454.

See Johnson

; '4 5 I • 2d at :

H e n c e , a p r o p e r inventory search m a d e p u r s u a n t t o

s t a n d a r d i z e d p r o c e d u r e s b y a n o f f i c e r w h o is a l s o s e a r c h i n g for
e v i d e n c e of the

::M ii i: le w i l l

be upl l e l d ,

-

. .

11

[T] he pivotal determination with respect to the
inventory search issue" is whether the State
presented sufficient evidence to support a
finding that the searching officer "acted in
compliance with established procedures for
conducting an inventory search." "Inventories
should not be upheld under Opperman unless the
government shows that there exists an established
reasonable procedure for safeguarding impounded
vehicles and their contents and that the
challenged police activity was essentially in
conformance with that procedure." Hygh, 711 P.2d
at 269 (quoting 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure §
7.4, at 576-77 (1978))
Strickling, 844 P.2d at 988.
In the present case, the State failed to ea.i ry i ts bi n den
of establishing the nature of the West Valley Police procedures
for impounding vehicles or that the officers acted in compliance
with such pi ocedures.

The search in Ihiu

<"M:II'

Wdi.'i d subterfuge

to search the vehicle and was not done pursuant to a valid
inventory search.

Accordingly, the trial judge erred in refusing

to suppress the evidence seized from the car.

A. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THE NECESSITY FOR
TAKING AN INVENTORY OF THE VEHICLE.
The State has the burden of establishing "the necessity
f o r t:l le t a k i n g ai id t l le i n v e n t o r y of t h e v e h i c l e . "
at 268.

Hycrh,

; ] II P . 2d

"If impoundment was neither authorized nor necessary,

the search was unreasonable."

Id.
21

While the arrest of the

driver can be a proper justification for impounding a vehicle,
arrest alone does not establish the necessity of impounding a
vehicle.

See Id. at 268-70.

Instead, the State must sustain its

burden by establishing the procedures which guide officers in
determining whether to impound a vehicle and that the
circumstances made impoundment lawful and necessary.

Id.

In this case, the State failed to establish that
impoundment and taking of an inventory were necessary.

Officers

Gill and Schmidt searched the passenger compartment without first
ascertaining the name of the owner of the vehicle.
113, 115.

R. 109, 112,

The owner's name was apparently available and somewhat

readily ascertainable since the officers were able to easily
locate the owner that evening.

R. 115-16, 125.

The officers

apparently learned the owner's identity through an "ID card as
well as the bill of sale for the owners" (R. 110) which evidently
were found in the vehicle.

R. 110.

Presumably, information

regarding the owner's identity would be available in the glove
box or through a routine computer check.

Either way, the name

could have been located prior to the officers' rummaging through
the interior and trunk of the vehicle.
Nor did the State establish precisely when the officers
learned the name of the owner.

The trial court found that the

decision not to impound was made after the heroin was found.
R. 52.

This finding does not directly address when or how the

officers learned the owner's identity.
Schmidt testified that "the vehicle was going to be
22

impounds'-

••

o f f i c e r McCarthy a r r i v e d an I saii d 1 le ] :i lows t h i s

person and possibly where this owner of the vehicle lived."
R. 126.

This suggests that the owner's name was known when

McCarthy arrivec .. the scene.
McCarthy testified that he was asked to impound the
vehicle, but "'once we found out who the owners were, that' s whe xi
I asked if I could take care of it in a different manner."
R. 113.

McCarthy indicated that the officers were still trying

to find the owi i€ i : '" s i laine w h e n M c C a r t h y f ounrl h e r o i n
R. 109.

i n t h e r runk .

Schmidt was with McCarthy, however, when they searched

the trunk.

,1. 99-100, 109, 122.

Because Schmidt was involved in

tryinc ' • ascertain the ownei "" s ident. ity,

l.lii.w buggests thai I lie

officers learned the name of the owner before the trunk was
searched, or that they did not make an effort to ascertain the
name until after the search was completed.

Under either

scenario, this evidence demonstrates that the State did not
establish that impoundment was necessary.
The State had the burden of establishing that a lawful
impoundment occurred.

In this case, where the owner's name

apparently could have been ascertained before the search an I 1:1le
vehicle was not impounded, the State failed to carry its burden
of establishing that the search in this case occurred as part of
a lawful impound.
The State's failure to establish when or how the officers
ascertained the identity of the owner combined with the remaining
circumstances further demonstrates that the State did not.
23

establish that impoundment of the vehicle and taking an inventory
were necessary in this case.

The officers returned the vehicle

to the owner shortly after the arrest.

R. 52, 100, 115-16, 125.

They did not produce an inventory in the police report or
elsewhere.2

R. 52.

They acknowledged that the search was

conducted to find narcotics.

Under such circumstances, the State

failed to establish that impounding the vehicle was necessary.
Instead, the Findings and Conclusions indicate that the officers
began "impoundment procedures" inasmuch as they began searching
the vehicle.

R. 53.

The Conclusions state further:

Examination of the car preparatory to impoundment
was according to procedures. The fact that an
inventory sheet was not used was not fatal. The
process was interrupted by the supervising
officer's decision to return the car to its
rightful owner. The search was not
inappropriate, it was part of legitimate steps
taken in the process of impoundment, which
process was interrupted by the decision of
Officer McCarthy.
R. 53.
The Findings and Conclusions fail to address the critical
legal question of whether impoundment was necessary and whether a
lawful impoundment under Opperman occurred in this circumstance
where the officers did not list the contents or otherwise produce
an inventory and returned the vehicle to its owner.
2

The trial court found that McCarthy "testified that an
inventory list was not prepared in this case, but that money,
needle, spoon and heroin removed from the car were noted in the
police report." R. 52. The items listed in the police report were
evidence--a spoon and syringe--and not an inventory of all items in
the car. R. 112. Indeed, the police report did not include nonevidentiary items which would normally be included in an inventory
list. R. 104, 110.
24

11 i t h i s c: a s e

\A, 1 1 e i: e

t he S t: a t e £ a. i ] e ci t: o e s t ab 1 i s h t ha t

i m p o u n d m e n t w a s n e c e s s a r y , t h e search of t h e v e h i c l e failed t o
qualify under the Fourth Amendment inventory exception.

B. T H E S T A T E F A I L E D T O E S T A B L I S H T H E E X I S T E N C E
OF A S T A N D A R D I Z E D , R E A S O N A B L E P R O C E D U R E F O R
S A F E G U A R D I N G IMPOUNDED V E H I C L E S A N D T H E I R
CONTENTS AND IT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE
POLICE CONDUCT WAS IN CONFORMANCE WITH SUCH A
PROCEDURE.
Police officers must follow a standardized procedure for
inventorying the contents of a vehicle in order to comply with
the Foi irth Amendment

Opperman, 96

* .

-

officers may exercise some discretion in carrying out such
procedures, such discretion must not be unlimited.

See Wells,

110 S.
The rationale for requiring standardized procedures and
limiting police discretion is that such procedures and limits
will preclude :i riventory searches from turning into "a ruse for a
general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence."
Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635.

The State has the burden of

establishing the necessity of taking the inventory, the existence
of standardized procedures which are designed to produce an
inventory of the items, and that officers followed such
procedures.

Strickling, 844 P.2d at 988-89.

The State can sustain its burden of establishing the
existence and nature of the policy through the testimony of the
officers.

See Id. at 990.

While the State need not introduce

the written policy in order to establish the procedures, it must
25

nevertheless introduce testimony regarding the details of the
inventory procedure in order to establish that the officers acted
in compliance with an existing policy when searching the car.
Id.
In Stricklinq, the State relied on the officer's
testimony regarding the established procedure for conducting an
inventory search.

According to that testimony, the vehicle must

be searched completely and "the search will include but not be
limited to the trunk, locked portions of the vehicles, locked
cases etc."

Id.

The officer testified that he followed the

procedure and did not deviate or terminate the search when he
found the stereo.

Based on that testimony, the district court

found that the State established the existence of standardized
procedures and that the officer followed those procedures in
conducting the inventory search.

This Court, while recognizing

that the evidence of standardized procedures was "admittedly
thin" in Stricklincr, nevertheless upheld the findings since they
were not clearly erroneous in light of the officer's testimony.
Id.
In this case, the State failed not only to establish the
necessity of taking the vehicle, it also failed to establish the
existence of standardized procedures designed to produce an
inventory or that the officers followed such procedures in this
case.
The State did not introduce a copy of the written policy.
Instead, it relied on the testimony of the officers.
26

R. 98,

103-06,

110-11,

1 1 6 1 8.

T h a t t e s t i r n o i i> f a i ] ed t o estab 1 ish

the

procedures of the West Valley Police for inventorying vehicles.
Indeed, the testimony suggests that officers have complete,
unguided discretion in decidi ilg whethei

;-_•: .; vehicle and

in deciding whether to list the items found in a vehicle.

Id.3

The testimony also fails to establish whether the entire vehicle,
including trunk, i s to be searched, and, if so, whether searching
under the spare tire in the trunk is part of an inventory search.
Nor does the testimony establish the procedi ire t: D be util i zed
when officers encounter a container.
The testimony regarding the procedure was "thinner" than
the "admittedly thin" testimony in Stricklii.J

.•

railed l •
-

establish the existence of a policy for inventorying vehicles
which would produce an inventory rather than allow officers to
embark oi i a fishi rig expediti on.

See Stricklinc;

4 I • 2d at 990

Officer Gill testified that his procedure when he
impounds a vehicle is to " [iInventory a vehicle, take an
inventory of all iteniy in the vehicle."

K, ^H

».M .
1 1 also

testified that policies and procedures require officers to fill
out a form as part of an inventory.
that policy <.;- ;
inventory searches.

R. 104.

He later testified

. .re that a form be filled out for all
R. 105-06.

Defense counsel: And when you do an inventory
search, do you fill out a form?
Gill:

Not always.

3

The trial court found in this case that " [t]he officers had
considerable discretion in how to proceed" R, 52.
27

Defense counsel:

Isn't it standard procedure?

Gill: Depends on the type of search, depends on
the totality of the circumstances, whether or not
the vehicle's taken, state tax impounds, it's on
impound reports. We didn't have an impound
report at this time.
R. 106.

Gill's testimony fails to establish the policy for

listing contents of a vehicle or any other policy or procedure
for impounding or inventorying vehicles.4
4

In his oral ruling, the trial judge's only determination
which touched on the standardized inventory procedures was a
statement that "[t]he fact that the inventory sheet or inventory
form was not used . . . does not make the search fatal because the
ultimate impound of the vehicle was interrupted by Officer
McCarthy's decision to attempt to return the vehicle to the
rightful owner." R. 145. The State created an additional finding
which appeared in the counsel-drafted Findings and Conclusions.
The Findings and Conclusions state:
[McCarthy] further testified that the West Valley
impound
procedure,
which
he
assisted
in
formulating, provides that a special inventory
list was not necessary in all circumstances. In
some circumstances the contents of the car could
be noted in the police report. The officers had
considerable discretion in how to proceed.
He
further testified that an inventory list was not
prepared in this case, but that the money, needle,
spoon and heroin removed from the car were noted
in the police report. No other contents of the
car were noted in the police report.
R. 52. The finding that McCarthy testified that the West Valley
Police Department policy allowed officers to note the contents in
the police report is clearly erroneous and not supported by the
evidence. The marshalled evidence in support of this findings is
as follows:
(1) McCarthy testified that he notes items in the
police report. R. 110-11.
(2) McCarthy testified that there is "a section on the back
of the handwritten report where you can fill in
vehicle information." R. 116-17. (emphasis added)
(3) McCarthy testified, "[w]e've been advised to just make
a notation in your report, what if anything had to
be unlocked or opened." R. 116-17.
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M c C a r t h y testified that he w a s familiar with f IIM- West
V a l l e y Police D e p a r t m e n t ' s p o l i c y regarding i n v e n t o r y s e a r c h e s
and that h e h e l p e d w r i t e i t . R. 110

W h e n asked t o o u t l i n e that

p o 1 icy, t: 1 ie fo1 1 ow:i ng exchange occurred:
Prosecutor: And what is that policy with respect
to making inventory searches of vehicles? In
what circumstances is that done?
McCarthy: Any time we arrest anybody, any time a
vehicle's going to be impounded, an inventory
will be done, and if possible, a canine officer
will have the dog do a sniff of the vehicle for
purposes of looking for narcotics.
Prosecutor:
instance?

And was that policy followed in this

McCarthy: No, if there's something out of place,
you would note it. If there was something of
value or something like that, you could take it
into custody or you could give it to the owner.
We do have an inventory sheet. I very frequently
use it. I just note it in the narrative of the
report.
R. 110-11.
O n c r o s s - e x a m :i n a t i o n, M c C a r 11 i y

t e s t :i f i e d t: 1 I a t h e rarely

While McCarthy testified that he notes items in the police report,
he did not testify that the procedures allowed him to list the
inventory in the police report. R. 110-11.
McCarthy's
testimony
regarding
including
vehicle
information on the police reports says nothing about including an
inventory list in the police report.
Finally, McCarthy's testimony regarding notations for
unlocked or opened containers addresses only such containers and
not whether policy allows officers to include inventory lists in
their reports. Nor do the findings or testimony establish that
officers are required to make an inventory list--regardless of
whether that list is on an inventory form, in the police report or
on a separate sheet of paper. Instead, as the findings reflect,
11
[t]he officers had considerable discretion in how to proceed."
R. 52.
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used inventory forms.

R. 116.

Defense counsel: We don't have any inventory
sheets or inventory forms, correct?
McCarthy: No, I rarely use them. It's like they
say, if it's a state tax, that is an inventory
portion right on the state tax form. This
vehicle wasn't being seized for that. I'd
already determined to let the owners have it
back.
Defense counsel: Does West Valley City Police
have such an inventory sheet?
McCarthy: They do and it's the present policy,
and the policy then is the supervisor on duty
determines whether or not a car's going to be
forfeitable and that night I knew, because there
was a large lien on it, it was a brand new car,
the city would not be interested in paying off
the lien.
Defense counsel: And isn't it true that the
normal policy and procedure is to fill out the
inventory sheet?
McCarthy: No. Like I said, it's -- if it's
going to be state tax, that is a state tax form.
If it's just a driver arrest, hold for warrant,
there's a section on the back of the handwritten
report where you can fill in vehicle information.
As far as inventory, there's been a lot of
discussion on the bottom because there's no
section there for locked containers. We've been
advised to just make a notation in your report,
what if anything had to be unlocked or opened.
R. 116-17.
McCarthy's confusing and contradictory testimony fails to
establish the procedures to be followed for impounding and
inventorying vehicles, or that such procedures were followed in
this case.

McCarthy indicated at one point that the policy is to

do an inventory and call for a canine officer so that a dog can
sniff the vehicle.

R. 110-11.

McCarthy testified, however, that
30

this policy was not followed in this case.

R. 110-11.

His later

quoted testimony fails to specify the policy regarding
impoundment decisions, making an inventory list, or any other
details of an inventory such as (1) whether the search is to be
completed if contraband is found, (2) whether locked containers
are to be searched, and (3) whether searching below the spare
tire in a trunk is part of a valid inventory search.
The testimony of Officers Gill and McCarthy was the only
evidence presented by the State regarding the West Valley Police
Department inventory procedures and policies.

This testimony

fails to establish standardized procedures which officers are
required to follow.

Unlike Stricklinq, the testimony did not

establish whether trunks and unlocked containers are to be opened
or whether officers are required to search completely and produce
an inventory even after contraband was found.

Nor did the

testimony establish whether officers were required to keep a list
of items found.
Much of the testimony involved what the officers did when
they inventoried a vehicle rather than what policy required them
to do.

In fact, McCarthy testified inconsistently that he

frequently used impound forms (R. 110) and that he rarely used
them (R. 116-17) . What officers usually do or do not do does not
establish what the policy requires.
The testimony suggests unlimited discretion is afforded
officers in deciding whether to list items and how to conduct an
inventory.

R. 106, 110-11, 116-17.
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Vehicles which are impounded

for state tax delinquencies apparently are subject to a more
standardized procedure than vehicles impounded for driver
arrests.

R. 106, 116-17.

Indeed, the trial judge found that the

officers "had considerable discretion in how to proceed."

R. 52.

This unlimited discretion afforded officers does not meet the
Fourth Amendment requirement that inventory searches be conducted
pursuant to standardized procedures in order to be lawful.

See

Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 2610; Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1632-35.
Although the officers' testimonies could be interpreted
to allow an inventory without the use of an inventory sheet, that
testimony fails to establish what the procedures are or that such
procedures are designed to produce an inventory of items rather
than to allow officers to conduct a fishing expedition.

Gill's

testimony suggests that the officer decides, based on the
totality of the circumstances, whether to list the items.
R. 105-06.

McCarthy's testimony also suggests that the officer

has complete discretion in deciding whether to list items found.
Prosecutor: Now do you ordinarily make an
inventory list in the course of this inventory
search?
McCarthy: No, if there's something out of place,
you would note it. If there was something of
value or something like that, you could take it
into custody or you could give it to the owner.
We do have an inventory sheet. I very frequently
use it. I just note it in the narrative of the
report.
The officers found the heroin in the trunk, in a

32

container under the spare tire.5

R. 51-52, 109, 112-13.

The

State failed to establish that searching under spare tires is
part of a routine, standardized inventory search in West Valley
City.

Nor did it establish that searching the trunk or opening

containers was part of standardized procedures.6
In this case, the State failed to present evidence which
established that the West Valley Police Department inventory
policies were designed to produce an inventory of items in the
vehicle or that the officers followed such a procedure in this
case.

The search of this vehicle did not therefore fit within

the inventory exception, and all items seized from the vehicle
should be suppressed.

C. THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE WAS AN
IMPERMISSIBLE SUBTERFUGE TO SEARCH FOR NARCOTICS
EVIDENCE.
The totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the
inventory search was a pretext or subterfuge to search the
vehicle for evidence.
to search the vehicle.

The arresting officer asked for permission
R. 103.

The officer testified that he

5

The trial judge found that the heroin was under the spare.
R. 51-2. This finding is contained in the State-drafted Findings
and Conclusions.
R. 50-54.
This finding is supported by the
evidence. R. 112-13.
6

In Johnson, 745 P. 2d at 455, the inventory search was
upheld because the State established that the search was conducted
pursuant to a mandatory Los Angeles Police Department checklist,
and that areas under the hood and in the trunk are to be searched
pursuant to that checklist. By contrast, in this case, the State
did not present evidence as to whether searching the trunk or under
spare tires was part of the standardized procedures for inventory
searches.
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could not remember Montoya's response to that request.

R. 103.

The arresting officer then decided to arrest Montoya and impound
the vehicle.

R. 98.

The police report indicates the officers

were searching for narcotics when they went through the car.
R. 105.

Additionally, McCarthy believes that one reason for an

inventory search "is to find dope."

R. 118.

The officers did

not prepare an inventory list, the officers apparently did not
complete the inventory after they found the heroin, and the
vehicle was not impounded.

The heroin itself was found in a

container under the spare tire, an area which would not be likely
to be searched as part of a routine inventory search.

R. 51-2,

109.
When the United States Supreme Court carved out the
inventory search as an exception to the Fourth Amendment probable
cause requirement, it clarified that such inventory searches did
not violate the Fourth Amendment in circumstances where there is
no suggestion that the inventory "was a pretext concealing an
investigatory police motive."

Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3099.

Subsequent case law requires standardized procedures so that
inventory searches cannot be used as "a ruse for a general
rummaging in order to find incriminating evidence."
S. Ct. at 1635.

Wells, 107

See also Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268 ("the inventory

exception does not apply when the inventory is merely 'a pretext
concealing an investigatory police motive'"); Rice, 717 P.2d at «
696.
Although the Utah and United States Supreme Courts have
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rejected the pretext doctrine in arrest and seizure contexts (see
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1134 (Utah 1994); State v. Harmon,
910 P.2d 1196, 1204 (Utah 1995); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
, 116 S. Ct.

, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996))7, the inquiry as to

whether an inventory search which is merely "a ruse for a general
rummaging" should nevertheless be made in the inventory search
contexts.
The rationale for rejecting the "pretext doctrine" in
Lopez was that an officer who detains an individual based on a
reasonable suspicion or probable cause has complied with the
Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness regardless of the
subjective motivation of the officer.

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135-

37; see also Whren, 135 L.Ed.2d at 101.

The pretext doctrine is

therefore unnecessary since the officer has a valid basis to
detain the individual and is required under the Fourth Amendment
to limit the scope of the detention to that which "is necessary
to effectuate the purposes of the stop."

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135

(quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319,
1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)).

7

In Harmon and Lopez, the Court indicated that "[t]he
pretext doctrine focuses on whether a hypothetical reasonable
officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances, would have
undertaken the challenged Fourth Amendment activity." Harmon, 910
P.2d at 1204 (citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134) . The term "pretext"
has not been used in precisely this manner in inventory search
contexts. Rather than focusing on what the hypothetical reasonable
officer would do, inventory cases focus on whether the inventory
search was merely a pretext to search for evidence.
The term
"pretext" as used in the inventory search context is therefore
different from the "pretext doctrine" as it evolved in reasonable
suspicion and probable cause cases.
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By contrast, an officer who conducts an inventory search
does not proceed based on probable cause or particularized
suspicion to search a vehicle.

Instead, the Court created an

inventory exception to the warrant requirement.

"Because

inventories promote such important interests and are not
investigatory in purpose, they do not implicate 'the interests
which are protected when searches are conditioned on warrants.'"
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267.8
In carving out a limited exception which is not based on
probable cause or particularized suspicion, the courts have
cautioned that the inventory search label cannot be used as a
means for evading " [f]undamental constitutional guarantees
against unreasonable searches."

Id.

In Whren, the United States Supreme Court recognized the
distinction between employing pretext inquiries in the inventory
search context as opposed to situations where the search or
detention is based on probable cause.
96-97.

See Whren, 135 L.Ed.2d at

The Court quoted its pretext language in Wells and

Bertine, then distinguished those cases by pointing out that the
officers did not have probable cause to support those searches.
Id.

The Whren court stated in part:
But only an
these cases
Burger, 482
601, 107 S.

undiscerning reader would regard
[Wells, Bertine and New York v.
U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27, 96 L.Ed.2d
Ct. 2636 (1987) (an administrative

8

The interests protected by inventory searches are
(1) protection of the owner's property, (2) protection of the
police and public from potential danger, and (3) protection of
police from claims of lost or stolen property. Id.
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inspection case)] as endorsing the principle that
ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct
that is justifiable on the basis of probable
cause to believe a violation of law has occurred.
In each case we were addressing the validity of a
search conducted in the absence
of probable
cause. Our quoted statement simply explains that
the exemption from the need for probable cause
(and warrant), which is accorded to searches made
for the purpose of inventory or administrative
regulation, is not accorded to searches that are
not made for those purposes. See Bertine, supra,
at 371-372, 93 L.Ed.2d 739, 107 S. Ct. 738;
Burger, supra, at 702-703, 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 107 S.
Ct. 2636.
Whren, 135 L.Ed.2d at 97.

(emphasis added)

Cases have consistently held that a valid inventory
search does not occur where "the inventory

x

is merely a pretext

concealing an investigatory police motive.'"

Hygh, 711 P.2d at

268 (quoting Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3100); see also State v.
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1987); Wells, 110 S. Ct. at
1635.

Indeed, the inventory exception is based on the

determination that such searches are reasonable because they
protect important interests, are conducted pursuant to
standardized procedures, and are not used as a subterfuge to
search for evidence.

Therefore, an important justification for

allowing an inventory search exception is that inventories are
not conducted as a pretext or subterfuge.

Inquiry into whether

the inventory was conducted as a pretext or subterfuge for
searching for evidence remains valid despite the decisions in
Harmon and Lopez.
In this case, the circumstances demonstrate that the
"inventory" search was a pretext to search for narcotics.
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Accordingly, a valid inventory search did not occur in this case.

D. UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE
SEARCH WAS NOT A VALID INVENTORY SEARCH;
ACCORDINGLY, ALL ITEMS SEIZED FROM THE VEHICLE
MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
The State failed to sustain its burden of establishing
that under the totality of the circumstances, the search of the
vehicle fit within the inventory search exception.
The State failed to establish the procedures the West
Valley Police Department follows in conducting inventory
searches.

The State also failed to establish whether searching

the trunk of a vehicle or searching under the spare tire in the
trunk was part of a routine inventory search in West Valley City.
Nor did the State bear its burden of establishing that the
officers followed standardized procedures in conducting this
inventory search.

See Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3099; Bertine, 107

S. Ct. at 743; Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635; Stercrer, 844 P.2d at
988; Hycrh 711 P.2d at 269; see discussion supra at 26-33.
Additionally, the State failed to establish the necessity of
impoundment.

Indeed, the vehicle was returned to its owner

without being impounded.

See discussion supra at 21-25.

The officers' failure to produce any sort of inventory
along with the officers' admissions that they were searching for
drugs further indicate that a valid inventory search did not
occur in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, the

officers' search of the vehicle and trunk was a pretext to search
for drugs; the State failed to sustain its burden of establishing
38

that the search of this vehicle fit within the inventory
exception.

Because the State failed to establish that the

evidence found in the vehicle was located during a valid
inventory search, the evidence must be suppressed.

See Wells,

110 S. Ct. at 1635; Rice, 717 P.2d at 697.

POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE INCORRECTLY DENIED
MONTOYA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS TAKEN IN
VIOLATION OF MIRANDA
All of the officers appear to agree that Montoya was in
custody before McCarthy arrived.

R. 97, 107, 121, 126.

Gill had placed handcuffs on Montoya.

R. 107, 121.

under arrest at the time he was handcuffed.

Officer

Montoya was

R. 121, 126.

The State did not establish that any of the officers
informed Montoya of his Miranda9 rights after he was arrested
but before he made incriminating statements to McCarthy.
114, 124.
Montoya.

R. 105,

After he arrived at the scene, McCarthy questioned
R. 108.

McCarthy:
[S]o I asked him -- street term. I
asked him if he was doing some cheve. He stated
he was, which is a street term of heroin.
R. 108.
Defense counsel: Isn't it true that even after
the drugs were found, you continued to
interrogate the defendant while he was seated in
the police car?
McCarthy: Like I said, my concern, it wasn't an
interrogation type of thing because I know him
and know the family. I wanted to make sure he
9

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966) .
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was okay. He finally told me he was going to
overdose and that's why we were concerned about
the medical people.
R. 118.
In his motion to suppress, Montoya requested that
statements taken from him in violation of Miranda be suppressed.

The trial judge resolved the Miranda issue by determining
that M[t]here were no incriminating statements made after the
arrests."

R. 53.

A. INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS WERE MADE AFTER
THE ARREST.
In his oral ruling, the trial judge stated:
Trial Judge: Now, I am not persuaded that the
fact or failure to Mirandize the defendant is a
detriment to this defendant because I don't
really see where the evidence has established
anything that was of an incriminating nature
after the time of the arrest prior to any
Mirandizing being accomplished that would work to
his detriment. Indeed, statements made, if they
were, were in large part incomprehensible to the
officers.
R. 144.
The trial judge's determination that "[t]here were no
incriminating statements made after the arrest[]" appears in the
written Findings and Conclusions as a "Conclusion of Law."
R. 53.

Regardless of whether this determination is considered a

finding or conclusion, this Court should disregard the
determination in resolving this issue because it is both
incorrect and clearly erroneous.
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The uncontroverted testimony in this case establishes
that Montoya was under arrest when McCarthy arrived at the
convenience store.

R. 97, 107, 121, 126.

Montoya was under

arrest at the time he was handcuffed; he was handcuffed when
McCarthy arrived.

R. 107, 126.

Officers Gill and Schmidt

searched the interior of the vehicle after they had arrested
Montoya; those officers had already searched the interior when
McCarthy arrived.

R. 98, 107, 112.

agreed that Montoya was under arrest.

The officers themselves
R. 97, 107, 121, 126.

McCarthy's testimony establishes that he questioned
Montoya after McCarthy arrived at the scene and received
comprehensible answers which were incriminating.

R. 108, 118.

McCarthy asked Montoya point blank if he were taking "cheve."10
According to McCarthy, Montoya said he was.

R. 108.

In

addition, McCarthy questioned Montoya about his condition.
Montoya ultimately responded that he was going to overdose.
R. 118.

Based on this uncontroverted testimony, the trial

judge's determination that no incriminating statements were made
after arrest is incorrect and clearly erroneous.11
10

According to McCarthy, "cheve" is a street name for heroin.

R. 108.
11

The marshalled evidence in suppport of this erroneous
determination includes Gill's testimony that he had a conversation
with Montoya after he was in custody but that the conversation
"[d]idn't go very far" because Montoya "was having a hard time
understanding any of [Gill's] questions."
R.100.
While this
testimony
supports
a finding
that Montoya
did not make
incriminating statements to Gill after he was in custody, it does
not address the statements to McCarthy.
Additionally, Gill
testified that Montoya made a statement about beer and a joint to
Gill shortly after the officer arrived. R. 96, 103. While this
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B. THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING THAT THE OFFICERS INFORMED MONTOYA
OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE INTERROGATION
BY MCCARTHY.
The trial judge's findings regarding the Miranda issue
apparently include a finding that the officers did not Mirandize
Montoya immediately after arrest.

R. 118.

When stating his

ruling on the record, the judge began his Miranda ruling by
stating:
Trial Judge: Now, I am not persuaded that the
fact or failure to Mirandize is a detriment . . .
R. 118.

(emphasis added)
The judge continued:
. . . because I don't really see where the
evidence has established anything that was of an
incriminating nature after the time of arrest
prior to any Mirandizing being accomplished . . .

R. 118.

(emphasis added)

In addition, the counsel-drafted

Findings and Conclusions do not include a finding that Montoya
was Mirandized and instead rely on the erroneous determination
that Montoya did not make incriminating statements after he was
arrested.

R. 53.

The testimony demonstrates that the State did not sustain
its burden of establishing that the officers Mirandized Montoya
and that Montoya waived his Miranda rights prior to the custodial
interrogation by McCarthy.

See Miranda, 86 S. Ct. at 1628 (heavy

burden on State to demonstrate waiver).
testimony supports
made to Gill after
questioned an in
responses. R. 97,

a finding that no incriminating statements were
arrest, the evidence establishes that McCarthy
custody Montoya and received incriminating
107, 121, 126, 108, 118.
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Officers McCarthy and Schmidt testified that they did not
inform Montoya of his Miranda rights.

R. 114, 124.

Officer Gill

never testified that he informed Montoya of his Miranda rights
prior to the custodial interrogation.

R. 105.

The following

exchange is the only reference by Gill to Miranda rights.
Defense counsel: Isn't it true that you never
gave the defendant Miranda warnings?
Officer Gill:
R. 105.

No.

While this response suggests that at some point Gill

gave Montoya Miranda warnings, it does not demonstrate that such
warnings were given prior to the statements made in response to
McCarthy's interrogation.

If Gill gave Montoya Miranda warnings

at the jail or on the way to the jail or even the following week,
he would have responded as he did.

At any rate, Gill's testimony

failed to establish that Gill gave Montoya Miranda warnings prior
to McCarthy's interrogation.
For the State to sustain its burden, it would have had to
ask Gill follow-up questions which would establish that Gill
delivered Miranda warnings prior to McCarthy's custodial
interrogation.

The State's failure to ask such questions,

particularly in the face of Montoya's claim and the burden placed
on the State, suggests that Gill did not give Miranda warnings
prior to the custodial interrogation.
A defendant must knowingly and voluntarily waive his
Miranda rights in order to admit a statement.
at 1630.

Miranda, 86 S. Ct.

Courts employ "every reasonable presumption against

such waiver."

State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah App.
43

1995).

In addition, a Miranda warning is "an absolute

prerequisite to interrogation."
354 (Utah App. 1913).

State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351,

Statements elicited through custodial

interrogation in the absence of a Miranda warning are
inadmissible.

Id.

In this case, the State has not established that an
officer Mirandized Montoya prior to McCarthy's custodial
interrogation or that Montoya waived such rights.

C.

MCCARTHY INTERROGATED MONTOYA.

McCarthy's testimony establishes that McCarthy questioned
Montoya.

R. 108, 118.

McCarthy attempted to explain his

interrogation by indicating that he was concerned for Montoya's
safety.

Regardless of whether the questioning was motivated by a

safety concern, it nevertheless amounted to interrogation.

As

such, Miranda and its progeny required that Montoya be informed
of his rights prior to such interrogation.

See Wood, 868 P.2d 70

(Utah 1993); Snyder, 860 P.2d at 358.

D. MONTOYA'S STATEMENTS TO MCCARTHY MUST BE
SUPPRESSED.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees that a defendant shall
not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." To secure this
fundamental right, Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 U.S.
436 (1966), established procedural safeguards to
be followed in a custodial interrogation. The
prescribed procedures require a warning that the
defendant has the right to remain silent and the
right to have an attorney present during
questioning. Id. at 444.
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Wood, 868 P.2d at 81.
A Miranda warning is required prior to any custodial
interrogation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
82; Miranda, 86 S. Ct. at 1630.

See Wood, 868 P.2d at 81-

Where officers fail to give the

required Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interrogation, an
accused's subsequent statement must be suppressed.

Wood, 868

P.2d at 81; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1630.
In this case, the State failed to establish that the
officers gave Montoya the required Miranda warnings prior to this
statements to McCarthy.

R. 105, 114, 124.

Indeed, in the face

of Montoya's claim that he was not Mirandized, the State's
failure to put on contrary evidence that the officer Mirandized
Montoya implies that no such timely warnings were given.

Under

such circumstances, the trial judge's denial of Montoya's motion
to suppress the statements must be reversed.

Montoya

respectfully requests that this Court reverse that portion of the
order and remand the case to the trial court where he be given
the opportunity to withdraw his conditional plea.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand this case to allow him the opportunity
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to withdraw his conditional plea.

SUBMITTED t h i s

^

oCP'^dav

of S e p t e m b e r ,

1996,

Cjkh\ CakW
JOAN C. WATT

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

46
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office,
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. 0. Box
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this ^^fo^dav of
September, 1996.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED this

day of September, 1996.
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ADDENDUM A

TK.v-. - . •. - " -fqt
JOAN C. WATT, #3967
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone:
532-5444

MAR 2 9 1S96

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER AND RESENTENCING
NUNC PRO TUNC

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
RANDY J. MONTOYA,
Defendant/Petitioner.

Case No. 951900016
HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Based upon petition and stipulation of counsel and for
good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that based upon a finding that
Petitioner RANDY J. MONTOYA was denied his constitutional right
to appeal, Petitioner is hereby resentenced nunc pro tunc
pursuant to State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), and
State v. Hallett. 856 P.2d 1060

(Utah 1993).

Petitioner is

resentenced nunc pro tunc to the sentence imposed on April 7,
1995.
DATED this

March, 1996.

0 f»<li s ,\

JUSSE^T

IN T H E T H I R D JUDTCTAtDISTRICT C O U R T
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

Case No. .
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter _
Bailiff
Date

«
Defendant.

qswooflifo FS
P. ftrfc\c)r\

Ay\\

}

H}

\W

to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason^why sentence
ed, and defendant having been convicted
convicied by •D a jury;^]
t t e court; J^plea of guilty;
should not be imposed,
j^
-a felony
D pleai of rvo
r\o contest; of the offense of
-a- class
•--'"
"'''
' court1 and
anc* ready
' for
' sentence and
class.
of the O
degree, Q" a
misdemeanor,
being
now present in
represented by
, and the State being represented by
! f i £ \ is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
years and which may be for life;
• to a maximum mandatory term of
y ^ n o t to exceed five years;
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
• not to exceed
years;
^ a n d ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $to
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_
ja. such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion o f ^ S t a t e , D Defense, QCourt, Count(s)

^

_^
±- A

oL\^\Q U v^S

oo

_
\ \
are hereby dismissed.
m\sse

Q?\SO^X

D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation iriW
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
V Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^(for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this. Judgment and Commitment.
^ C o m m i t m e n t shall issue ^ v ^ \ ^ v ^ \ H
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

day of

7*"

ADDENDUM B

F , L E D

n

David W. Brown - 5671
Attorney for Defendant
2727 West 3500 South, Suite 220
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Telephone: (801) 964-6200

DISTRICT COURT
c=;
S3 F E B - I PM It= l»2

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
]i

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

!

vs.

;
I
]
I
]

RANDY MONTOYA,
Defendant.

Case No. 951900016 FS
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his counsel of
record, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal

Procedure, moves this

Court for an Order

suppressing all evidence, oral or tangible, obtained directly or
indirectly from:
The August 24, 1994 arrest, detention and interrogation
of Defendant, and the search and seizure of evidence from his girl
friend's

1994 Mitsubishi•

Evidence

seized from the vehicle

included heroin and drug paraphernalia.
The arrest, detention, interrogation, search and seizure
were in violation of Defendant's constitutional rights under the
Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution,

and

under

article

I, section

14 of

the Utah

Constitution.
At approximately 3:15 a.m.. on August 24, 1994, Defendant
was illegally stopped by several West Valley City police officers

0 0002 0

while he was on the premises of a 7-11 located at 4600 South 4000
West.

Defendant had been shopping at the 7-11. At the time police

arrived, Defendant was outside the store and outside the vehicle.
Defendant was arrested for public intoxication.
vehicle was

not

impounded.

The vehicle was

released

to

The
its

rightful owner and regular driver, Shannon Pina, and her sister,
Shantel Santos.
Defendant seeks to suppress statements made to the police
which were part of a custodial interrogation and elicited without
any Miranda warning.

In response to direct police questioning,

Defendant told them he had been drinking and had used drugs.
All evidence seized was the fruit of the original illegal
un-Mirandized confession of Defendant by the officers. Because the
stop

and

interrogation

were

unconstitutional,

subsequently seized is inadmissible.

all

evidence

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d

181, 184 (Utah 1987); see, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
The evidence seized was found during an alleged inventory
search, even though the vehicle was not impounded.

The inventory

search was merely a pretext to search for drugs.
Defendant

respectfully

requests this Court order the

suppression of all evidence resulting from the illegality alleged
herein, and which is described with more particularity in the
attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof.
The suppression hearing has been scheduled for February
6, 1995, at 10:00 a.m.
2

€00021

DATED this 1st day of February, 1995,

David W, Brdwii ^ — - ^
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the
foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS were
hand-delivered this 1st day of February, 1995, to the following:
Cy H. Castle
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, #S3700
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200
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David W. Brown - 5671
Attorney for Defendant
2727 West 3500 South, Suite 220
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Telephone: (801) 964-6200
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT re©URTcT£RK
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS ANI
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 951900016 FS
RANDY MONTOYA,
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his counsel of
record, and hereby files this Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Defendant

respectfully

requests

the

opportunity

to

supplement this Memorandum following the evidentiary hearing on
February 6, 1995.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On or about August 24, 1994, Defendant was stopped

at the 7-11 on 4600 South 4000 West in West Valley City.
2.

The West Valley City Police stopped him outside the

7-11 at approximately 3:15 a.m.
3.

Defendant had driven to the 7-11 in his girlfriend's

vehicle, a 1994 Mitsubishi.
4.

(Police report at 5.)

Defendant had been shopping at the 7-11, and had

returned to the vehicle to secure some change to complete paying
for some food.
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5.

At the time the police arrived, Defendant was

outside the store and also outside the vehicle.
6.

Defendant was immediately handcuffed and placed into

custody for public intoxication.
7.

The police asked Defendant "if he had been drinking

or taking any types of drugs."
8.

(Police report at 5.)

Defendant "told [police] that he had been drinking

earlier and that he had smoked a joint."
9.

(Police report at 5 ) .

The police then made an extensive search of the

vehicle, which the officers described as an "inventory" search. No
inventory form, report, list or sheet was completed.
10.

During the exhaustive search of said vehicle, the

police found and seized a syringe, a cut-off tablespoon, 1.25
ounces of heroin, and a telephone bill.
the trunk.

The heroin was found in

The police also seized $835 from Defendant's wallet.
11.

The vehicle was not impounded; it was returned to

Shantel Santos, the sister of Defendant's girlfriend, Shannon Pina.
12.

The police report states that the vehicle was not

Defendant's, and was returned to its owner.
13.

(Police report at 6.)

Police further interrogated Defendant, who allegedly

admitted that he had recently used heroin, approximately five $20
bags.

(Id.)
14.

At no time did any officer give Defendant his

Miranda warnings.
15.

Defendant was arrested and charged with a second

degree felony for unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, a Class B Misdemeanor for unlawful
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possession of drug paraphernalia, and a Class C Misdemeanor for
intoxication.

(See Information).
ARGUMENT

I.

All Statements Defendant Made To Police
Suppressed For Violation of Miranda.

Should

Be

This Court should suppress all statements made to the
West Valley City officers because they were elicited as part of a
an improper custodial interrogation on August 24, 1994.
The officers specifically asked Defendant if he had been
drinking or using illegal drugs. These questions resulted in the
alleged confession by Defendant that he had been both drinking and
using illegal drugs. Defendant allegedly told the officers that he
had earlier "smoked a joint," and also used about five $20 bags of
heroin.
This interrogation by the officers is in clear violation
of the doctrine established in Miranda v. Arizonar 384 U.S. 436
(1966).

Defendant was never given any Miranda warning during the

questioning by West Valley City officers.

It is undisputed that

Defendant was subject to interrogation by various officers, and
that he was handcuffed and in custody during this period.
questions

asked

by

the

officers

incriminating remarks from Defendant.

were

designed

to

The

elicit

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446

U.S. 291 (1984). A reasonable person in Defendants position would
not have felt free to leave or tell the officers to leave and
terminate the encounter. Berkemer v. McCartyr 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
In this case, Defendant's freedom of movement was restricted to
such a degree that it was akin to an arrest.

United States v.
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Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
Since the alleged confession regarding drugs was not
given freely and voluntarily, it was coerced and in gross violation
of Miranda. All statements made by Defendant should be suppressed.
II.

All Evidence Seized From The Vehicle Should Be
Suppressed As Fruit Of The Original Illegal Confession.
The statements elicited from Defendant by the officers

were

clearly

improper

and

inadmissible.

Such

inadmissible

statements cannot be used by police to justify a search of the
vehicle.
All evidence obtained as a result of the illegality,
including the subsequent results of the vehicle search, should be
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree."

Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
Statesf 251 U.S. 385 (1920).

There are no facts which would argue

that the later search and seizure were attenuated from the taint of
the original illegal confession.

Almost no time elapsed between

the confession and the search.
The officers used the information about drugs obtained
from Defendant to search the vehicle. All evidence seized was then
tainted by the initial unconstitutional confession.
The United States Supreme Court has frowned on law
enforcement entities using illegally obtained evidence to then
secure further evidence through proper channels. In Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United

States, 251 U.S. 385, 391

(1920), the

government seized documents from defendants which the federal court
4
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had suppressed because of an unlawful seizure. The government then
issued subpoenas for the same documents, basing its request on
information secured from the illegal search and seizure. The Court
ruled that the subpoenas were invalid because they were based upon
knowledge gained from illegally seized evidence. Id. at 391-92.
"The Court stated that the knowledge gained by the
government's own misconduct could not be used in this manner if the
Fourth Amendment was to be more than 'mere words.'"

W. Ringel,

Searches & Seizures, Arrest and Confessionsr vol. 1, §3.2(b) at 3-6
(1994).
Under Silverthorne Lumber Companyr it is clear that any
evidence or knowledge obtained through illegal means cannot be used
to justify a vehicle search.

The Court stated:

The Government now, while in form repudiating and
condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its
right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that
means which it otherwise would not have had.
The proposition could not be presented more nakedly.
It is that although of course its seizure was an outrage
which the Government now regrets, it may study the papers
before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the
knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in
a more regular form to produce; that the protection of
the Constitution covers the physical possession but not
any advantages that the Government can gain over the
object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act ...
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all.
Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 391-92 (emphasis added).
Justice Holmes' decision in Silverthorne Lumber Company
formed the basis for the landmark "fruit of the poisonous tree"
decision in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
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This Court should apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
to suppress all evidence seized from the vehicle as fruits of the
initial illegalities.

The methods used by the officers to gather

evidence are similar to the backdoor approach to securing evidence
that the Supreme Court quashed in Sil vert home Lumber Company.
In this case, the officers easily could have read
Defendant his Miranda warnings prior to the interrogation.

Their

failure to advise him of his constitutional rights renders the
confession inadmissible, as well as the fruits of said confession
—

the drugs and paraphernalia.
III. The Inventory Search Is Rendered Invalid By The Officers'
Failure To Impound the Vehicle.
It is anticipated that the State will attempt to justify

this search as a valid inventory search.

Defendant has found no

"inventory" search cases in which the vehicle was not impounded.
The officers' failure to impound said vehicle renders the purported
"inventory" search totally improper.

Further, the facts of this

case do not justify such a search.
Defendant's constitutional rights as set forth in the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
and article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, which prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures, were violated.

See, State v.

Potter. 863 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The Fourth Amendment secures the right to be free from
"unreasonable" searches and seizures.
(1968).

Terry v. Ohior 392 U.S. 1

This protection from unreasonable searches and seizures

extends to cars.

State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Ct.
6
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App. 1992) (citing Delaware v. Prouser 440 U.S. 648 (1971).
"The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated ...
because

stopping

an

automobile

and

detaining

its

occupants

constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of these Amendments, even
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention quite brief."
440 U.S. at 653.

Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1043 (quoting Prouse,

The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from

randomly or arbitrarily stopping vehicles. Id. at 1043.
In this instance, the facts show that the 1994 Mitsubishi
belonged to Defendants girl friend, Shannon Pina.

Instead of

impounding the vehicle, it was returned to Ms. Pina and her sister,
Shantel Santos.

Prior to beginning the search, the police had

elicited statements from Defendant that he had been using drugs.
The search performed was for drugs, not to inventory said vehicle.
It is well established that an inventory search is an
exception

to

the warrant

requirement.

Oppermanr 428 U.S. 364 (1976).

See,

South

Dakota v.

The policy reasons for permitting

a warrantless search of an "impounded vehicle" are to protect the
public and police from danger, avoid police liability for lost or
stolen property, and protect the owner's property.

Id.; State v.

Hygh. 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added).
None of these policy reasons apply when the vehicle is
not impounded.

Thus, the police cannot inventory a vehicle in

preparation for impounding, then decide not to impound the vehicle,
and still use the seized evidence as part of a valid inventory
search.

Such a scenario runs totally afoul of the case law and
7
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doctrine permitting inventory searches as an exception to the
warrant requirement.
IV.

The Alleged Inventory Search Was a Mere
Concealing Police Motive To Search for Drugs.

Pretext

The case law interpreting inventory searches establishes
that the West Valley City officers cannot use their "inventory"
search as a mere pretext to justify such a search for drugs.
However, the inventory exception does not apply when the
inventory
is merely
a
"pretext
concealing
an
investigatory police motive." Fundamental constitutional
guarantees against unreasonable searches cannot be evaded
by labeling them "inventory" searches.
State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d at 268.
The decision in Hygh is directly in point.

Gillis Hygh

had been convicted of aggravated robbery based upon evidence seized
from the trunk of his vehicle purportedly during an inventory
search.

Hygh had been stopped for an expired safety inspection

sticker.

During the stop, the officer determined that Hygh had

outstanding

warrants.

committed other crimes.

The

officer

also

suspected

Hygh had

He then proceeded to search the vehicle

under the "inventory" exception to the warrant reguirement. Id. at
266-67. In the trunk, the officer found evidence linking defendant
to a recent robbery.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

reversed

the

lower

court

conviction, holding that the inventory search was not proper since
it was pretextual and not conducted according to proper procedures.
Id. at 268-70.

Hygh formed the basis for a similar reversal in

State v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1986).

"The purpose of the

8
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impound was to further the investigation of defendant's suspected
drug activities by creating a pretext for a custodial search."
Rice, 717 P.2d at 696.
The "impound" search by West Valley City is similar to
the searches which resulted in reversals in Rice and Hygh.

The

impound search was merely a pretext for the officers to look for
narcotics. The search followed none of the normal inventory steps
or procedures.

Utah courts have frowned upon inventory searches

which are not conducted in a legal manner and are merely a "fishing
expedition for evidence." State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 987
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122, 125
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the overwhelming constitutional violations
involved

in the

search and

seizure involving

Defendant, all

evidence should be suppressed.
CQNCLVSIQN
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant
Defendant's Motion and suppress all statements made by Defendant
and evidence seized from the 1994 Mitsubishi on August 24, 1994.
DATED this 1st day of February, 1995.

David W. Brown* -"^^
Counsel for Defendant
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ADDENDUM C

FlttD DISTINCT CSUBT
E. Neal Gunnarson
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Richard S. Shepherd - 2939
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South State Street, Room #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3422

Third Judicial District

MAR 2 4 1995
ASA,

By

Lki

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 951900016 FS
RANDY MONTOYA,
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant.
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th
day of February, 1995, on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the
Defendant being present and represented by David W. Brown and the
State of Utah represented by Richard S. Shepherd.

Testimony was

taken from Defendant and West Valley Police Officers Paul Gill,
James Schmidt and William McCarthy.

Following the taking of

evidence, the matter was argued both on the facts and the law by
both counsel for the Defendant and counsel for the State.

The

Court having heard the evidence and argument and being fully
advised

in

the

premises

makes

these

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On August 24, 1994, at 3:07 A.M., West Valley Police
Officers Gill and Schmidt responded to a call at a Seven-Eleven
Store located at 4600 South 4000 West. Upon arriving at the scene
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they found the Defendant, Randy J. Montoya, in the parking lot of
the store.

The Defendant was wearing only boxer shorts and

sandals. He was walking about in a nervous manner. His movements
were "jerky."

His behavior was erratic.

He was talking to

himself.
After observing the Defendant the officer came to the
conclusion that the Defendant was under the influence of some
drugs, and potentially a danger to himself or others.

He was

placed under arrest and handcuffs were placed on him.

When

questioned by Officer Gill, Defendant said he had consumed alcohol
and smoked a "joint."
Officers Gill and Schmidt prepared to impound the car
inasmuch as the driver was under arrest.

They began an inventory

search. They did not use an inventory or impound form. Inside the
vehicle between the seats Officer Gill found a hypodermic needle
and a spoon. Money was found scattered on the floor. The officers
called for assistance from Officer McCarthy.
Officer McCarthy, who was the supervising officer and
also an expert in narcotics matters, came to the scene.

He

observed the Defendant. He saw that he was frothing at the mouth,
his eyes were dilated and there appeared to be fresh needle marks
on his arms.

Officer McCarthy, based upon his prior experience,

believed the Defendant had ingested drugs. He was afraid that the
Defendant may have overdosed.

Medical help was called, and

eventually the Defendant was taken to the hospital.
Officer McCarthy looked in the trunk area of the car. In
the area under the spare tire he found five containers containing
2
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a substance that he believed to be black tar heroin.
Officer McCarthy testified that he determined that the
car that the Defendant had driven was in fact owned by someone
other than the Defendant, and that the owner was a person with whom
he was acquainted. He testified that as the supervising officer he
decided not to impound the car, but to notify the real owner. The
decision not to impound was made after the drugs were found.

He

testified that the car was a new car with a large lien, that would
not be a likely prospect for forfeiture, and further that he wished
to save the owner cost and inconvenience. The car was returned to
the owner.

At the time McCarthy returned the car, he asked to

search the apartment of the vehicle's owner, Shannon Pina.

She

refused to consent to the search.
He

further

testified

that the West Valley

impound

procedure, which he assisted in formulating, provides that a
special inventory list was not necessary in all circumstances. In
some circumstances the contents of the car could be noted in the
police report. The officers had considerable discretion in how to
proceed.

He further testified that an inventory list was not

prepared in this case, but that the money, needle, spoon and heroin
removed from the car were noted in the police report.

No other

contents of the car were noted in the police report.
The
intoxicated.

Defendant

testified

that

he

was

not

in

fact

He admitted that he had in fact used heroin earlier,

and that he was taken to the hospital where he was treated for the
effects of that drug.

Defendant testified that the vehicle was

searched two times, the items being seized on the second search.
3

CONCLUSIONS OF IAW
The Court finds that the testimony of the officers was
credible.

There was a legitimate basis for the arrest.

lawful arrest.

It was a

There were no incriminating statements made after

the arrest.
After the arrest it was reasonable to begin impoundment
procedures, the car could not be left in the parking lot at 3:00
A.M.

Examination of the car preparatory to impoundment was

according to procedures. The fact that an inventory sheet was not
used was not fatal. The process was interrupted by the supervising
officer's decision to return the car to its rightful owner.

The

search was not inappropriate, it was part of legitimate steps taken
in the process of impoundment, which process was interrupted by the
decision of Officer McCarthy.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
concludes that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.
DATED this rt/p^ay of March, 1995.
BY THE .COURT:

Approved as to form and
content:

David W. Br*
Attorney for Defendant
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